Mark Sandy,
Poetics of Self and Form in Keats and Shelley: Nietzschean
Subjectivity and Genre (Aldershot and Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2005), 160pp. ISBN 0-754-63579-1; £45/$89.95
(hb).
This book uses Nietzsche’s writings
to explore the treatment of the self as a fictional construct
in the work of Keats and Shelley and, in turn, argues that
both poets anticipate Nietzschean theories of subjectivity,
in particular his emphasis on ‘becoming’ rather
than ‘being’. Sandy’s post-structuralist
approach combines theoretical sophistication with a clarity
of expression that is not always to be found in this sort
of criticism. A notable strength of the book is its interweaving
of analysis of the poetry of Keats and Shelley, which leads
to some illuminating comparisons between the two writers.
The first chapter
begins with an elegantly self-reflexive account of the impact
of Nietzsche on deconstructionist and New Historicist approaches
to Romanticism, and goes on to consider Nietzsche’s
understanding of subjectivity as a succession of competing
fictions. Chapter Two is the most philosophically complex,
allying Keats and Shelley’s prose writing on poetics
and identity with Nietzsche’s rejection of Kantian dualism.
Sandy argues that both poets ‘campaign for an aesthetic
of self-revision and release of the self from such metaphysical
delusion’ (p. 16); the word ‘campaign’,
here, is an example of the book’s occasional tendency
to make Shelley and (particularly) Keats sound more philosophically
didactic than they are actually are. The following chapter
looks mainly at Alastor and Endymion, examining
the tension between the ideal and the real in these two poems
through Nietzsche’s notions of ‘Apollonian individuation’
and ‘Dionysian universality’ (p. 40). This leads
into an interesting discussion of Lamia, which suggests
that both Lamia and Apollonius produce ‘stifling and
exclusive fictions’ that collapse into Dionysian tragedy
(p. 55).
In Chapter
Four, Sandy investigates the self-consciousness about fictionality
exhibited by a range of Shelley’s and Keats’s
lyrics. There is some sensitive close reading here, but at
times—for example, after an extended discussion of ‘Ode
to a Nightingale’ (pp. 81–85)—Nietzsche
is deployed without really adding anything to the analysis.
The fifth chapter considers Adonais and The Eve
of St Mark as ‘autotelic literary structures, concerned
with their own cultural legacy and critical inheritance’
(p. 107), and the book ends by examining indeterminacy of
meaning and identity in the Hyperion fragments and
The Triumph of Life. Sandy argues, rousingly, that
these texts seek to ‘endow individuals with creative
potentiality to attain their identities through self-invention,
prefiguring Nietzsche’s belief that humanity could “overcome”
itself through self-creativity’ (p. 123) and suggests
that they encourage the active participation of their readers
in this process.
This book is
at times impressively sophisticated, but its lack of historicisation
leads to some strange omissions and crude statements. For
example, it’s simply not adequate to claim, without
even a reference, that the Enlightenment understood ‘the
self as a fixed, singular and autonomous entity’ (p.
vii; see also p. 8). A number of scholars (most notably the
late Roy Porter) have shown that the nature of personal identity
was highly contested and debated during the eighteenth century.
As described by Hume in Book One of A Treatise of Human
Nature, the self is anything but fixed: rather, it is
‘nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions,
which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and
are in a perpetual flux and movement’ and therefore
‘the identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man,
is only a fictitious one’ (my italics). And Adam Smith,
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, presents personal
identity in modern society as fundamentally intersubjective,
theatrical, and fluid. While the comparison of Keats and Shelley
with Nietzsche is an interesting and illuminating focus for
this study, it seems perversely ahistorical almost entirely
to ignore the intellectual context in which the two poets
actually wrote—Hazlitt, for example, who had plenty
of interesting things to say about the construction of selfhood
and who (unlike Kant) undoubtedly influenced Keats’s
conception of poetic identity, is not mentioned at all.
It’s
a shame that Sandy’s approach is so one-sidedly formalist
because much of his analysis is acute and suggestive. This
book is a valuable comparative study of Keats and Shelley,
and offers useful insights into the theoretical and critical
context of current Romantic studies. But what Nietzsche might
have termed the ‘genealogy’ of personal identity
is considerably more complex than Sandy acknowledges.
David Higgins
University of Chester